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ABSTRACT
A major question in the literature on the classical gold standard concerns the efficiency of
international arbitrage. Authors have examined efficiency by looking at the spread of the gold
points, gold point violations, the flow of gold, or by tests of various asset market criteria, including
speculative efficiency and interest arbitrage. These studies have suffered from many limitations,
both methodological and empirical. We offer a new methodology for measuring market integration
based on nonlinear theoretical models and threshold autoregressions. We also compile a new, high-
frequency series of continuous daily data from 1879 to 1913. We can derive reasonable econometric
estimates of the implied gold points and price dynamics. The changes in these measures over time
provide an insight into the evolution of market integration.
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How can we measure market integration? By way of illustrating a new approach
to the problem, this paper assesses the degree of market integration in the dollar-
sterling foreign exchange market of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.
The focus of our work, therefore, cannot be considered original—the study of
the Anglo-American foreign exchange market has been one of the most actively
pursued avenues of research in economic history. A major issue has been whether
the gold-standard regime was stable and efﬁcient, and tests of this have often
centered on whether the gold points bounded the market exchange rate. The gold
points, the exchange rates at which gold arbitrage would commence, then needed
to be estimated to facilitate the test. Thus, the literature has frequently focused
on getting this estimation right. However, a persistent lacuna in this literature
is suggested by the disconnect between the arduous work devoted to measuring
the gold points, and the apparent lack of progress in documenting the connection
between these measures and the actual behavior of arbitrageurs in the market.
Theconventionalwisdomhad long been thattherapid and efﬁcient adjustment
of the exchange rate under gold point arbitrage kept the dollar-sterling exchange
stable: in this view, large deviations from par supposedly provoked gold ﬂows
sufﬁcient to keep the rate always within the gold points (Cole 1929; Einzig 1970).
However, inﬂuential revisionist contributions by Morgenstern (1959) and Mog-
gridge (1972) sought to depict the classical gold standard as inefﬁcient. Their
estimates of gold points, based on transactions costs, suggested a narrow band,
one frequently “violated” by the actual movements of the exchange rate, even in
monthly time series.1
Standing up in defense of the conventional wisdom, Ofﬁcer has produced a
large body of research papers (1983; 1985; 1986; 1989; 1993), culminating in a
seminal book (1996). This corpus of work ﬁnds much at fault in the revisionist
literature. For example, the major studies all incorrectly used the cable transfer
rates of exchange when the dominant arbitrage instrument was the demand bill (or
sight bill), and, most importantly, they used ad hoc gold point estimates based on
secondary sources. Ofﬁcer’s response was to meticulously recalculate gold points
1This approach was revisited by Clark (1984), who reached similar conclusions using reﬁned
estimatesoftransactionscostsandfound,evenmoredisturbingly,persistentviolationsthatspanned
several monthly periods. Further consternation was caused by Clark’s ﬁnding that gold ﬂows
frequently did not correlate with arbitrage opportunities. Similar ﬁndings arose in an analysis of
pure exchange-rate time-series behavior in a probabilistic model by Spiller and Wood (1988).
1Table 1: Dollar-Sterling Exchange Rate, Ofﬁcer’s Monthly Data, 1791–1966
Percent sterling premium over parity
Std. dev. Std. dev.
Mean about about
Period Mean absolute mean zero Extremum
1791–1800 -2.70 4.55 5.06 5.75 -14.58
1801–10 3.46 4.17 3.48 4.93 9.52
1811–20 0.97 4.57 6.19 6.27 19.90
1821–30 1.23 2.01 2.06 2.40 -5.55
1831–40 -0.72 1.47 1.87 2.01 -6.10
1841–50 -0.73 1.11 1.26 1.46 -3.60
1851–60 0.42 0.65 0.68 0.80 -2.24
1861–70 0.32 0.87 1.20 1.25 -3.13
1871–80 -0.16 0.37 0.44 0.47 -1.09
1881–90 -0.19 0.33 0.36 0.41 -0.90
1891–1900 0.02 0.25 0.30 0.51 -0.61
1901–10 -0.03 0.14 0.19 0.19 -0.49
1911–14 -0.04 0.12 0.15 0.15 -0.28
1919–25 -0.12 0.24 0.27 0.29 -0.60
1925–31 -0.14 0.22 0.20 0.25 -0.43
1950–66 0.02 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.65
Sources: Ofﬁcer (1996, p. 103).
from ﬁrst principles, for the right instruments, and his summary volume lends
considerable weight to the restoration of the conventional wisdom.
In alongrun context, theconventionalviewalso makesagood dealofintuitive
senseoncetheyearsoftheclassicalgoldstandardareseeninhistoricalperspective.
By the late nineteenth century, the dollar-sterling exchange had reached its peak
level of stability, as shown in Table 1. It should then come as no surprise that
historians also place in this period, circa 1879 to 1913, the likely high-water mark
of international capital mobility in the modern era. Indeed, by some measures, it
is only in very recent years that measures of global ﬁnancial market integration
match levels seen under the classical gold standard (Eichengreen 1991; Obstfeld
and Taylor 2004).
We believe that signiﬁcant new contributions to the literature can be made
in two ways. First, we can better formalize the theory of arbitrage in the markets
concerned; and,second, wecanbringmoresuitablehigh-frequencydatatobearon
the question. In this paper, we make progress on both fronts, but with an approach
that is radically different to any previous method. It is appropriate, then, to spell
out the speciﬁc ways in which our analysis departs from the “state of the art” in
2the current literature.2
One deﬁciency in most of this literature, identiﬁed by Ofﬁcer (1996, p. 187)
is a curious dichotomy which ﬁnds studies of the gold points and the movement
of the exchange rate almost always divorced from each other. A major aim of this
paper is to formally model the linkage between the two for the ﬁrst time.
Ofﬁcer (1996, pp. 117–21) arrived at his method by discounting all the others.
What are those alternative methods? Ofﬁcer’s nine categories can be collapsed
into four:
(a) Consult an Expert or Two. The common method employed by newspa-
pers a century ago. An “expert” typically meant a foreign-exchange dealer
or a banker. But such sources may be inconsistent, unrepresentative, omit
some costs, and may not provide a complete time series.
(b) Find the Exchange Rate at Which Gold Flows. This elegant method
has obvious theoretical appeal, using as it does the principle of revealed pref-
erence. It was suggested over one hundred years ago by Newcomb (1886,
pp. 281–82), but his suggestions were neglected. The method has been
applied by various authors (e.g., Clark 1984), but has run into practical difﬁ-
culties due to the poor quality of gold-ﬂow data.3 However, later in the paper
we report some new, seemingly reliable, and previously unused data on gold
ﬂows that re-open this possibility.
(c) Use the Exchange-Rate Maximum and Minimum. The advantage of
this technique is the minimal data requirement. The main problem is the
maintained assumption: that any gold-point violations are eradicated so in-
stantaneously by arbitrage that we never observe them. This is clearly, a
priori, a tenuous assumption; in a moment we will show that it is in fact
erroneous.
(d)Break DownAllComponentsof Transaction Costs. Thebeneﬁt isthat
it makes no maintained theoretical assumptions. The obvious problem is the
intense data requirement. A less-obvious problem is whether these direct
cost estimates do indeed correspond to the behavior of the arbitrageurs in
question.
Ofﬁcer proved the feasibility of method (d) whilst casting grave doubt on
2See, inter alia Moggridge(1972),Davis and Hughes(1960),Bloomﬁeld (1959),Morgenstern
(1959), Cole (1929), Spalding (1915), Seyd (1868), Goschen (1861), and Ofﬁcer (1996).
3As noted by Ofﬁcer (1996, 118), the bilateral gold ﬂow data for many periods were, in Mor-
genstern’s (1955) words, “worthless” for ﬁne-scale analysis, and, in Goodhart’s (1969) view, in
need of corrections for four independent sources of error: shipping time, transit shipments via
third countries, incomplete customs reporting, and clerical errors. Moreover, such corrections are
feasible only after 1899, Ofﬁcer argues.
3method (a).4 Still, it remains an open question whether the methods (b) and (c)
can be improved upon, and whether they might shed light on the actual process
of arbitrage, one of the weaknesses of method (d). A major contribution of this
paper is to show how to implement a novel variant of Newcomb’s elegant test
in method (b) using a nonlinear model to detect the points at which the onset of
arbitragebehaviorbegins,whilstusingonlythetime-seriespropertiesofthereliable
exchange-rate(price)data, and avoidingthepitfallsofusingthedubiousgold-ﬂow
(quantity) data in method (c). Even so, for the few years in which new sources of
data can supply more reliable gold-ﬂow data we can perform a cross-check, where
we ﬁnd qualitative evidence to support our conclusions.
If our approach is to be feasible, however, a richer dataset is needed than has
been hithertoassembled. Accordingly,intheﬁnal andmostlabor-intensivecontri-
bution of the paper, we have constructed by hand a new dataset of high-frequency
(daily) exchange rates from newspapers, a new time-series with a frequency that
more closely corresponds to the adjustment horizon in the actual market. We next
discuss thesedata, and the operation of the market, before movingon to the theory
and empirics.
2D a t a
2.1 Exchange Rates
Previous researchers have relied on monthly, quarterly, or annual data series. Al-
though weekly data are reported in certain sources (e.g., some documents of the
National Monetary Commission), we decided to collect data at the highest fea-
sible frequency for the entire period of the classical gold standard, namely daily
data for the period 1879–1913. This covers every full calendar year of the dollar-
sterling gold standard that began with the restoration of U.S. convertibility after
the Greenback suspension on January 1, 1879, and ended with the suspension of
U.K. convertibility in August 1914 (Ofﬁcer 1996, pp. 16 and 43).
We collected the exchange rates based on sterling demand bills in New York
sinceitisnowacceptedthatthedominantformofarbitrageundertheclassicalgold
4For example, the publication by The Economist of an invariant gold point spread (for several
currencies, probably due to Ernest Seyd) in every issue from late 1877 to 1916 is rightly deemed
unsatisfactory. The critique of shortcut techniques, like those of Clark (1984) that assume some
componentsofcosts, oruse costaggregations,areproperlytested againstthe strictandunforgiving
ruler of repeated ﬁne-scale measurement.
4standard was via the demand bill (or sight bill) denominated in sterling and drawn
on London. Only later, in the interwar period, did cable or telegraphic transfers
dominate the market. In earlier periods, the sixty-day bill introduced in colonial
times was the preferred instrument, except for a brief period in the mid-nineteenth
century when a three-day bill was used (Ofﬁcer 1996, pp. 113–15).5
Wewent to thebestprimary sourceforthesedata, theFinancialReview,w h i c h
tabulated daily data on the New York exchange each year in an annual summary.6
Sight bill quotations are usually in a range, e.g., “4-85 85-1/2” meaning between
4.85 and 4.855 on that day. We convert such ranges to a midpoint. There is
considerable rounding in the quotes: often the ﬁnest gradation is one half cent.7
This minimizes the information in the data, and effectively shrinks the meaningful
range of points in the search algorithm to ﬁnd the best-ﬁt threshold (a blessing, at
least, in terms of computational cost).
The data cover every trading day, that is, every day except Sundays, holidays,
and a few exceptional days on which the exchange was closed. We discard non-
trading days and perform time series analysis on the series of price quotes for
trading days only. Thus, we have about 300 daily observations on the New York
price of sterling demand bills in each year from 1879 to 1913. This represents an
enormous amount of data for time-series analysis: over 10,000 observationsin the
entire sample. With such a dataset we should have ample information to identify
parameters of interest and how they change over time.
Figure 1 displays the exchange rate deviation xt = Et − Epar measured in
dollars where we deﬁne parity as the ratio of the ﬁxed mint prices of gold in the
United States (Pg, in dollars per ounce) and Britain (Pg∗, in pounds per ounce),
5The use of bills may seem surprising given the deployment of the ﬁrst trans-Atlantic cable
in 1866, but it appears to follow from high transaction costs involved in cable transfers and in
securing forward cover for the duration of any gold shipment (Davis and Hughes 1960; Perkins
1975; Ofﬁcer 1996, pp. 60–63 and 115).
6We thankLawrenceOfﬁcerforsuggestingthissourceto us. Thetabulationscoveredsightand
sixty-day bills; we compiled both series, but only the information on sight bills is used here. Note
that these are “posted rates” of banks, taken from the weekly data published by the same company
intheirCommercialandFinancialChronicle. Theweeklypublicationalsopublished“actualrates”
fortransactions,butthesewerenotsummarizedfortheannualreview. We donotknowwhichrates
were more relevant for arbitrageurs. However, based on inspections for selected years it is hard to
see any systematic tendency for “posted rates” to diverge from “actual rates,” except for a small
differencein levels. We thank Jan Tore Klovland for pointing out this difference. In principle, one
could comb the weekly publication for the “actual rate” daily observations, but this would require
handlingﬁfty-two times as manypublications,andthis provedbeyondour scope. Instead, we took
the thirty ﬁve annual summaries and entered the daily data on “posted rates.”
7Speciﬁcally, before 1904 the ﬁnest distinction is 0.5 cents, thereafter 0.05 cents.








Note: The ﬁgure shows the deviation from parity, Epar = 4.86656, in dollars.
Source: Financial Review.
that is, Epar = Pg/Pg∗ = 4.86656. We note that the maximum deviation from
parity over the full period was slightly more than $0.05 or about 1.06%. The
dynamics of xt will be the object of study in the remainder of the paper. We think
it is fairly clear that xt does not exhibit explosive behavior and we will assume
stationarity in all inference and seek to identify any nonlinear dynamics in the
series as suggested by theory.8
2.2 Gold Flows
Though our initial focus is mainly on arbitrage as it relates to price dynamics, we
will later perform some cross-checks on our analysis by using two new sources
of gold ﬂow data. The quality of gold ﬂow data was ﬁrst seriously questioned by
8Ifitisnotobviousfromthechart,we canreportthattheAugmentedDickeyFullerteststatistic
(with intercept, linear time trend and three lags chosen by the Schwarz Criterion) was a highly
signiﬁcant −7.22.
6Morgenstern (1955), who found serious discrepancies in many periods between
the reported imports of gold received and the exports of gold sent for several
countries, including the U.S. and Britain. The source of Morgenstern’s data was
the Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States published
by the Department of Commerce. Goodhart (1969) performed a much-needed
correction for the period 1900–13 to strip out various mistakes, and he found that
there was then a fair match between export and import data provided by the U.S.
and Britain. However, Goodhart’s data are available only on a monthly basis,
which is too low a frequency to be of use in a model of arbitrage activity.
Prospecting for new gold ﬂow data, we made a lucky strike. After writing
most of this paper, we discovered previously unused (at least for this purpose)
gold export data published in the Annual Reports of the Director of the U.S. Mint.
Between May 1888 and July 1889 about $60 million in gold was exported from
the U.S., and this was a matter of great concern for the Director of the Mint. In
response he began publishing tables in his annual report documenting the exact
date, quantity,anddestinationofgoldexportsfromNewYork, whichwasthemain
port of departure. The data are apparently directly obtained by the Assay Ofﬁce
in New York from Customs reports and appear to be of better quality than any
previous data put to use, although, as with most gold export data, there seems to
be an occasional problem of ﬁguring out the precise destination of any shipment.
We compiled these daily data from the original source as soon as they came to
our attention—which was thanks to Captain Martin Bayerle, who had examined
this source for quite a different purpose, in an effort to prove that the liner RMS
Republic, which sank in fog two days after sailing for France from New York on
January 22, 1909, was carrying a large and clandestinegoldshipment.9 Hewrites:
“I found the French import data very reliable, and an almost exact match between
US exports and French imports exists for the years 1904–14” (personal communi-
cation). In many cases there is an almost exact match between these ﬁgures and
Goodhart’s numbers, although on several occasions there are large discrepancies.
9Thus, the loss of the Republic, even at the time the biggest maritime loss in history, could now
precipitate the most lucrative salvage operation ever known. Bayerle believes the cargo was an
enormous quantity of bullion and coin intended by the U.S. government as a subscription to part
of the massive Russian bond issue of that year, making its movement—and perhaps all the more
so its irrecoverableloss—a verypolitically sensitive matter. Conspiracytheorists have long stoked
these rumors, egged on by the ofﬁcial silence of the American authorities and the unprecedented
failure of the British Board of Trade, under Winston Churchill, to hold the requisite legal enquiry,
the ﬁndings of which might have averted the loss of another White Star vessel, the RMS Titanic,
three years later. See <http://www.rms-republic.com>.
7Although, one has to be fairly skeptical about any one particular observation of
gold exports, and possibly some gold exports are missed in these tables, overall
they seem sufﬁciently detailed and reliable as a check on our methods.
Sadly, no comparable source for gold imports exists as the director of the Mint
was less worried about heavy gold inﬂows. The best data that we are aware of
was compiled and generously provided by Andrew Coleman (1998). He collected
weekly shipping reports published in the New York Times between March 1895
and November 1901. The quality of these data is also an issue, as newspaper
reportsare consideredtobetheleast reliablesource, andtheshorttimespanisalso
a major disadvantage. Unfortunately, these data provide only weekly aggregates
and only for a limited number of years.
3 A Model of Gold Point Arbitrage
We next explore the workings of the market and construct a tractable model of
gold point arbitrage based on certain key features: the demand for sterling sight
bills in New York, changes in the net supply of bills via gold point arbitrage, and
the costs and beneﬁts of the arbitrage operation itself.
3.1 Demand for Sterling Bills in New York
Leonard Presnell, perhaps only half jokingly, once declared that the “international
gold standard” was a misnomer, and that the regime would be better described by
the term “the international bill-on-London standard” (Davis and Gallman 2001,
131). The serious point here is that the functioning of the sterling-centered system
depended not only on the free convertibility of gold both in London and overseas,
it also involvedtheabilityto quickly and easily translate domesticcurrency claims
into sterling claims, and vice versa, using an important “quasi-money”—the leg-
endaryﬁnancialinstrumentknowsas thesterlingdemand(orsight)bill. Innovated
in centuries past this was a negotiable instrument that was almost universally ac-
ceptable in trade and ﬁnance circles, and hence highly liquid. It could serve as a
means of payment for trade, or, if remitted to London and cashed on sight (that is,
on demand), it could perform as a vehicle for capital movement. Accordingly we
think of the demand for a stock of sterling sight bills in offshore centers, such as
New York, as being analogous to a demand for quasi-money, and we will base our
analysis on a partial equilibrium model of that market.
8Let the stock of bills in the New York market be Bt.10 The price of these bills
in U.S. dollars is simply the exchange rate on demand (sight) bills expressed in
U.S. dollars per pound sterling, Et. The ﬁrst building block of our model is an
expression of the market for such bills, written as a demand curve,
Et = ψ − ηBt + ut, (1)
where ψ and η>0 are demand parameters, and ut is a shock to the demand curve
at date t. Thisequation states that an increase in thequantityof bills Bt intheNew
York market leads to a fall in the price of bills Et.11
Both gold and sterling bills will circulate in the model between two centers,
London and New York. We note at this point that although there are two centers
and two goods in the model, meaning four prices, we do not need to consider the
market for bills in London, nor the market for gold in both centers, since in those
markets we can effectively treat prices as ﬁxed, and all arbitrage in this system
is driven by one price, that of sterling demand bills in New York. The market
price of gold in each center was ﬁxed by the mints at the parity level adjusted for
the relatively ﬁxed transaction costs of buying and selling.12 The market price
of sterling bills in London, like those of a check to be cashed, was equal to their
face value plus or minus similar transaction costs (that is, a one pound bill in
London was worth, effectively, one pound). These institutional features motivate
our approach of considering a very simple form of price adjustment in Et only,
and argue against the application of a commodity-market type of model with price
adjustment in both locations (Coleman 1998).
The time series disturbance term ut is of concern, and it will be important in
what follows. We have no simple priors on this process, except to say that in the
10The extent of this market could, of course, include the entire United States, much of it linked
to the New York market. The development of the internal U.S. market and its relationship to the
externalmarket has been a subject of considerabledebate (Davis and Hughes1960; Ofﬁcer 1996).
11In what followswe will close the modelwith a supply relationshipwhere changesin the stock
of bills result from gold arbitrage. Technically, this was not the only source of bill supply. In
principle, bankers in New York, for example, could create new bills for redemption in London
without a corresponding gold movement to cover the bills. Instead, the banks would use the
sale proceeds to acquire U.S. dollar assets in New York, and would cover the bills in London
via the sale of British sterling assets. To model this process would require, however, a model of
banks’internationalportfoliochoice, and to estimate it would requirecomprehensivedata on bank
portfolios. We have no such model and no such data.
12However,the modelcan be easily extendedto applyto “triangular”arbitragevia third markets
and to situations where the gold price in one or more centers is subject to exogenous variation.
Coleman (2002) discusses arbitrage between New York and London via Paris and cases where the
London gold price was affected by the use of gold devices by the Bank of England.
9longrunitisprobablynotstationary. Itmayevenhaveadeterministictrend,related
to long-run trends in, say, the international trade in New York and its dependence
on sterling bills, or possibly other structural factors relating to technical change
or growth in the ﬁnancial sector, or the desire of agents to make shifts in their
dollar versus sterling portfolios. We consider all such derived demand, supply,
and “taste” shocks as exogenous shifts and for thepresent purpose we impoundall
these effects in the disturbance term.
3.2 The Mechanics of Gold Point Arbitrage
We next consider how gold and sterling bills circulate between the two centers.
Wheneverarbitrage via demand bills takes place, the arbitrageur effectivelyswaps
a demand bill in New York for gold in London, or vice versa, through shipments
across the Atlantic. Revenues could be derived in this trade when the exchange
rate Et (the market price of demand bills in New York) diverged from its par value
Epar, the latter given by the ratio of the ﬁxed mint prices of gold in the United
States (Pg, in dollars per ounce) and Britain (Pg∗, in pounds per ounce), that is,
Epar = Pg/Pg∗. Provided such revenues exceeded transaction costs, the trade
would be proﬁtable.
Table 2 relates the changes in the quantity of gold and bills in the typical
transactions. Thetableshowsﬁrstthattherewasnodelaybetweenthearbitrageurs’
actionsandthechangeinthestockofbillsintheNewYorkmarketandthisimplies
that we can ignore bill shipment delays. It is never the case that the New York
market has to wait for bills to arrive from another center like commodities—they
are simply created by ﬁnancial intermediaries.13 The table shows that, in both
directions, the relationship between gold movements and changes in the stock of
demand bills is given by
 Bt =−Pg∗ Gt, (2)
where  Gt is gold inﬂow into New York, and  Xt = Xt − Xt−1 for any variable
Xt.
A remarkable feature of gold point arbitrage was that there was littleor no risk
in the realization of proﬁt. Suppose that the New York arbitrageur takes proﬁts in
dollars in New York. In the case of gold export the revenue is taken out before
gold is acquired for shipment, and there is no risk, no interest cost, and proﬁt is
13In contrast, Coleman’s (1998) model includes shipment delays as would occur in commodity
markets.
10Table 2: Gold Import and Export Via Demand Bill
Time Place Action by arbitrageur Gain Loss
Export of one ounce of gold, with E > Epar
t = 0 New York sell demand bills $ EPg∗ bills £Pg∗
t = 0 New York buy gold gold oz. 1 $ EparPg∗
t = T London sell gold £Pg∗ gold oz. 1
t = T London redeem bill bills £Pg∗ £Pg∗
Marginal revenue $ (E − Epar)Pg∗
Bills inﬂow £+Pg∗
Gold inﬂow oz. −1
Interest cost in time zero
Import of one ounce of gold, with E < Epar
t = 0 New York buy demand bills bills £Pg∗ $ EPg∗
t = T London redeem bill £Pg∗ bills £Pg∗
t = T London buy gold gold oz. 1 £Pg∗
t = 2T New York sell gold $ EparPg∗ gold oz. 1
Marginal revenue $ (Epar − E)Pg∗
Bills inﬂow £−Pg∗
Gold inﬂow oz. +1
Interest cost in time 2T
Note: T is time fora one-waytrans-Atlanticvoyage. In thistable non-interestcostsare notshown,
such as mint charges, assaying, freight, insurance. See text and the discussion of the model.
Source: See Ofﬁcer (1996, pp. 111–13).
immediatelyrealized.14 Inthecaseofgoldimport,thetimeinterestcostisthatofa
two-wayAtlanticvoyage, whereaone-way triptakesa stochastictimeofexpected
length T.15 This introduces the possibility of an asymmetry in costs, and hence
in the gold points. Still, the arbitrageur could engage in advance the shipping
contracts, for a known price, and calculate expected proﬁt, adjusting for any risk
aversionto thestochastictimedelay oftwovoyages. Inneithercase, however,was
there uncertainty over prices, absent any default risk and neglecting any risk of a
loss in transit, say to due to the sinking of a ship at sea bearing bills or gold. It is
these unusual features of gold point arbitrage that make a simple, tractable model
both possible and desirable.
14That is, the arbitrageur exports only enough gold to cover the bills that need to be redeemed
in London, and keeps the remaining dollars as net revenue in period t = 0.
15With gold import, the bills have to go to sale in London at time T, and the gold has to come
back and be sold for the dollar proﬁt which is not realized until time 2T.
113.3 Costs of Arbitrage
The ﬁnal element of our model is the cost function for the arbitrage operation. We
will consider the cost function to be a convex (for simplicity, quadratic) function
of the ﬂow of gold  Gt. We will consider a representative arbitrageur with a cost
function for transactions that depends on the quantity of transactions. In reality,
withmanyarbitrageurs,thisamountstoadeﬁnitionofthesupplycurveofarbitrage
services. Since arbitrage operates in both directions, the cost function will be a
function of the absolute size of the ﬂow | Gt|. We suppose that the total cost of
the ﬂow is given by




This is a general technology where there are no ﬁxed costs, an initial marginal
cost b, and an increasing marginal cost at a rate c. In principle, the potential
asymmetryin interest costscan be accounted forby varyingthecoefﬁcients of this
transactiontechnologyineachdirection. Otherpossiblesourcesofcostasymmetry
are differences inabrasion costs, insurancepremia, freight rates, assayingcharges,
bank fees, or other cost components in each direction. In the empirical analysis
we will make explicit allowance for such asymmetries.
The arbitrage technology represents a departure from most of the traditional
gold point literature which assumes, at least implicitly, constant marginal costs,
with b > 0a n dc = 0. From Table 2 we know that the marginal revenue of one
extra ounce of gold movement is given by MR=| Et − Epar|Pg∗ Hence, in this
traditional view, once the marginal revenue of shipment exceeds marginal cost b,
goldfreelymoves(intheappropriatedirection)andtheexchangeratecannotmove
any further from parity. It is this view of the market that has motivated the use
of the exchange rate maximum and minimum as the estimates of the gold points
as in method (c). Upon closer inspection, we think that this view of the market
cannot be maintained. Consider the following three periods of large gold export
illustrated in Figure 2.
The ﬁrst period ofheavy gold exportswas from April 29, 1891 to July6, 1891;
the second period was from July 9, 1895, to September 20, 1895; and the third
period was from April 1, 1910, to April 26, 1910. In each of these episodes $30
to $35 million was exported from New York to England. As can be seen, in the
beginning of May 1891 the exchange rate reached $4.9 but exports still took place
in the end of June when the exchange rate was only $4.89. In the ﬁrst half of
October 1895 the exchange rate reached $4.91, but again many exports took place
in the beginning of September when the exchange rate did not go higher than

















































































































































































Sources: Financial Review and U.S. Mint Reports.
13$4.905. On April 26, 1910, theexchangerate reached $4.8795 but theﬁrst exports
startedwhen theexchangeratehadnotgonebeyond$4.8775. Evenifweallowfor
some errors in the gold export data it is hard to believe that these conclusions can
be overturned and we conclude, in accord with Ofﬁcer, that using the maximum
and minimum observed price (method (c)) is not satisfactory as a way to estimate
gold points.
We think a major reason for these results is that the marginal cost of gold point
arbitrage increased with the quantity shipped. This had at least two causes.
Firstly, the arbitrage ﬁrms had a limited amount of capital available for their
operations and using it for GPA made it unavailable for other uses. If they had
a portfolio choice of where to invest their capital they would have ﬁrst diverted
it from the lowest yielding alternative opportunities, and later from investment
opportunitieswithhigheryields. Thismechanismisobviouslyoutsidetherealmof
our partial equilibrium model, where we have purposely abstracted from portfolio
choices. The second reason is that costs of shipping gold could go up when
quantities increase, and this more directly ﬁts our model. Moreover, there is
copious evidence from contemporary reports to support this notion. For instance,
gold could be exported either as gold bars or gold coins, where the ﬁrst one was
the least costly method for arbitrageurs.16 However, when exports were heavy
the U.S. Mint could not always provide gold bars, and arbitrageurs would have to
resort to the more costly method of gold coins.
For example, on December 22, 1908, of a $500,000 shipment by Goldman
Sachs the Wall Street Journal noted that “this engagement of gold bars represents
the accumulation of daily receipts at the Assay Ofﬁce during the past ten days, or
since the National City Bank took all the suitable gold bars there when it shipped
$4,000,000 on Dec. 12. The Assay Ofﬁce is thus again without any exportable
bars.” Such events were not unusual. On May 18, 1909, the New York Post stated
that: “Thedemandforexchangewassomuchinexcessofsupplyastomakeexports
extremely proﬁtable with sterling bills selling at today’s high level. There was a
rush to secure gold for Europe almost as soon as the market opened, and the fact
that the coin obtainable at the Sub-Treasury was in very good condition led many
bankers to risk the usual chance of abrasion in sending coin instead of bars.” Two
days later the Journal of Commerce described a “scramble” for gold bars wherein
banks werereserving ahead each day’sentire meltingsand theSuperintendent was
16Why? Compared to bars, coins would be bought at a discount by an overseas mint; they were
more awkward to transport, being more easily abraded; and they were much easier to purloin (and
one assumes, therefore, more expensive to insure).
14forced to place limits on such tactics.17
ItalsohappenedatleastoncethattheAssayOfﬁceofNewYorkran outofgold
andthatarbitrageurshadtosecuregoldfromotherAssayOfﬁceswiththeadditional
cost of shipping the gold to New York. This caused considerable consternation, as
the New York Commercial noted on January 12, 1909 under the headline “GOLD
EXPORTS STOPPED BY LACK OF GOLD BARS: BANKERS EVEN GO TO
PHILADELPHIA TO GET THEM”:
While it would be expensive to transport gold bars from Philadelphia
here, international bankers attempted to secure bars yesterday rather
than ship gold coin.…There has been much disapproval expressed
against the small supply of gold bars at the Assay Ofﬁce as on every
occasion of gold exports last year the movement was stopped by this
lack.”
The next day large shipments were reported in the same newspaper “almost all in
gold coin, a transaction that was not thought possible at any reasonable proﬁt.”
As might be suspected, when exports were heavy the U.S. Mint often started to
discourageexportsthroughadditionalcostsorinconveniences, andthisishintedat
above. Thus government policy, by the deployment of such “gold devices,” could
have thrown sand in the wheels of gold point arbitrage, leading just as surely to
increasing marginal costs.
We think the case for constant marginal costs cannot really hold in the face
of this evidence. To model increasing costs we henceforth assume a convex cost
functionandinordertoarriveataclosedformsolutionwerestrictittobequadratic,
which is always valid as a ﬁrst approximation.
3.4 Optimal Arbitrage
We now consider arbitrage operations. Arbitrageurs move gold up to the point
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Without loss of generality, consider
gold export at time t, where the import case is analogous. For export, we must
have Et > Epar and z > 0 units of gold are already being moved. From Table 2
weknowthat themarginal revenueof oneextraounceofgold movementis MR=
(Et − Epar)Pg∗; and, from equation (3), the marginal cost is MC = b + cz.B y
equating MC and MR, and by a similarcalculation for gold import, we obtain the
17Quotes here and below are as cited at <http://www.rms-republic.com>.







c((Et − Epar)Pg∗ − b) when Et − Epar > b/Pg∗;
0w h e n |Et − Epar|≤b/Pg∗;
+1
c((Epar − Et)Pg∗ − b) when Epar − Et > b/Pg∗.
(4)
From equations (1) and (2), gold ﬂows and the exchange rate are related via
 Et = ηPg∗ Gt + vt, (5)
where vt =  ut. We think vt, as the difference of ut, is likely to be a stationary
process. Inwhat follows,wewillassumethatvt isindependentbutnotnecessarily
identically distributed.
A solution follows from equations (4) and (5). To simplify the model, let us
normalize by deﬁning xt = Et − Epar,s ot h a txt is the deviation of the exchange
rate from par. We ﬁnd in the gold export regime that
 xt =  Et = ηPg∗ Gt + vt
=− ηPg∗(Et − E par)Pg∗ − b
c
+ vt
=− Pg∗αxt + αb + vt.
where α = ηPg∗/c. After some tedious manipulations of this equation we can
recover the principal object of our study, the difference equation governing the
dynamics of the exchange rate, as follows
(1 + αPg∗)xt = xt−1 + αb + vt;
xt =
1
1 + αPg∗xt−1 +
α
1 + αPg∗b +
1
1 + αPg∗vt;
 xt =− λ(xt−1 − γ)+ µvt; (6)
where 0 <λ= αPg∗
1+αPg∗ < 1, γ = b
Pg∗,a n dµ = 1
1+αPg∗ < 1. A similar derivation
holds for the gold import regime, and in practice, of course, the model parameters
might vary across regimes. When no arbitrage is proﬁtable, the stocks of bills and
gold remain unchanged and the exchange rate is driven by the disturbance term in





−λ(xt−1 − γ)+ µvt when xt−1 >γ;
vt when γ ≥ xt−1 ≥− γ;
−λ(xt−1 + γ)+ µvt when −γ>xt−1,
(7)
16Thismodelincorporatesasimpleformulationofgoldpointdynamics,athresh-
old autoregressive (TAR) model with three regimes and heteroskedasticity. If the
current exchange rate is in the upper and lower regimes, then the exchange rate
reverts toward the edge of the band (the nearest gold point) at a speed λ,w h e r e
necessarily 0 <λ<1. Within the band, in the middle regime, between the gold
points, there is no reversion and the process follows a driftless random walk. The
gold-point spread γ and the adjustment speed λ are intuitivelyrelated to the shape
of the underlying arbitrage cost function. An increase in the linear cost parameter
b causes an increase in the gold point spread γ, as in the traditional approach;
an increase in the quadratic cost parameter c causes a decrease in the speed of
convergence λ. We also see that λ = 1 and adjustment takes only one period in
the case where c = 0 and marginal costs are constant. This is intuitively obvious:
if marginal costs never rise, then enough gold will be shipped right away to force
the exchange rate back to the gold points. As we have argued, this case seems
empiricallyless relevant, as such shipmentsare not seen, norcan costsbe assumed
to be linear forever.
4 The Econometric Model
The models developed in the theoretical section ﬁnd their closest discrete-time
econometricrepresentationintheThresholdAutoregressionmodel(orTAR;some-
times referred to as SETAR or Self-Exciting TAR). In such models the dynamics
are governedby AR processes that differacross regimesdelineated by the position
of a lagged value of the dependent variable relative to a set of given thresholds
(See Tong, 1983 and 1990, and Potter, 1999, for an overview).
The general form of a TAR model with R regimes, an order k, and a delay






i xt−i +  r
t ,if γr−1 ≤ xt−d <γ r
where−∞ = r0 < r1 < ... < rR =∞and r
t isamartingaledifferencesequence.
InthismodelAR(k)dynamicsobtaininregimer.Theprocessisinregimer attime
t when the selection variable xt−d lies between two thresholds γr−1 < xt−d ≤ γr,
withr = 1,...,R and, byconvention,γ0 =− ∞andγR =+ ∞ . Wewillcallthis
model a TAR(R;k,d), or sometimes a TAR(R) when concealing the dependence
on k and d.
17We proceed to estimate all our models using Conditional Least Squares Esti-
mators (CLSE).18 This is performed in a two-step process. Given values for the
thresholds,eachregimeisestimatedusingOLS.Subsequently,wemininizethesum
of the residual sum of squares over the values of γr using a simple grid-search.19




this function is continuous everywhere.




T-consistent and asymptotically normally dis-
tributed, and this permits the convenient construction of standard errors.21 Al-
thoughnotexplicitlyshown,theseresultsareassumedintheliteraturetogeneralize
to threshold models with more than two regimes.
The results of Chan and Tsay (1998) are not widely recognized but they are
important to the literature of market integration. In general one would expect that
the conditional expectation function is continuous, but that the adjustment process
is not. The fact that all inference is then standard makes life much simpler for
the applied researcher. In contrast, inference on the thresholds in the general TAR
model is currently only possible under further assumptions that we are unwilling
to make.
18See, for instance, Chan (1993). Alternatively,one mightestimate the modelsusing Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) assuming normality as in Qian (1998). The CLSE has attracted
more theoretical attention and consequently more results are known. Moreover, CLSE identiﬁes
thethresholdsfromthechangeinslopeparameters,whileMLEalsousesinformationinthechange
in variance. Since our modeldoesnotnecessarily predictthatthe processvt has constantvariance,
we prefer CLSE.
19Ofcourse,thethresholdscannotbemorepreciselyidentiﬁedthanisallowedbythecoarseness
of the grid that is generated by the discrete (rounded) selection variable xt−d. In our case, the
exchange rate for the full sample has 234 unique values.
20Note that these results to hold, the continuity restrictions must be imposed on the estimated
model.
21For the discontinuous TAR model the results of Chan (1993) apply. He shows in a two
regime model that: (a) all the estimates of the unknownparametersare strongly consistent; (b) the
thresholds converge at rate T; (c) the slopes parameters βr
i and intercepts βr
0 are consistent at rate √
T; (d) the slope parametersand thresholdsestimates are asymptotically independent;and (e) the
slope parameters are asymptotically distributed as if the thresholds are known.
184.1 A Fully Restricted Model
Weﬁrstestimatedthefullyrestrictedmodelasinequation(7)usingthefullsample
ofthetimeseriesdata,alltradingdaysfrom1879to1913inclusive.22 Werestricted
the grid search to values so that the middle regime by itself and the upper and
lower regime combined have at least 5% of the observations. This corresponds to
a restriction that the gold point falls in the interval [0.001,0.033] which seems a
priori not unreasonable.
The results are presented in Table 3. The threshold is estimated to be γ =
0.0324 or 0.67 percent parity of parity, which is remarkably consistent with Ofﬁ-
cer’s gold point estimates. The standard error on γ (computed using the Chan and
Tsay (1998) methodology) is only 0.0013 which suggests that γ is very precisely
estimated. Figure 3 plots the sum of squared residuals as a function of the thresh-
old. Theﬁgureshowsthesurprisingresultthatthereexistsasecondlocalminimum
at γ = 0.010 which is almost as low as the global minimum at γ = 0.0324.
4.2 An Unrestricted Model
To test the validity of the model, we then estimated a much less restricted speci-
ﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, without imposing any restrictions we estimated a series of
TAR(R;k,d) models with R = 3, 1 ≤ k ≤ 9; and 1 ≤ d ≤ k. We then examined
thefollowingimplicationsof themodel: onlytwothresholds; symmetryofthresh-
olds; convergence in outer regime towards the thresholds; symmetry in speed of
adjustment in the two outer regimes; random walk behavior in the middle regime;
and, ﬁnally, only a single lag in all regimes. To be consistent with the previous
section, we imposed that the upper and lower regime combined have at least 5%
and at most 95% of the observations.23
To choose between TAR models with the same R, but different values of k and
d, variousextensionsofstandard model-selectioncriteriahavebeen proposed. We




nr ln ˆ σ2
r + (k + 1)lnnr
22In all the results that follow the ﬁrst 10 observationsare used as startup values and are omitted
from the sample.
23This means that there is no restriction on the number of observations in each regime. If the
parametersof either the lower or upper regime are unidentiﬁed, the residual sum of squares in that
regime is set to zero.











Notes: Seetext. Standarderrorinparentheses. Theequationestimatedineachregimeisequation7.






This choice is motivated by the work of Kapetanios (1999) who showed that the
standard results regarding the consistency of the BIC and Hannan-Quinn criteria
and the non-consistency of the AIC procedure can been extended to TAR models.
However, Wong and Li (1995) conjecture that the asymptotic efﬁciency of AIC in
linear settings is carried over to TAR models, and simulation evidence seems to
showthattheAICoftenperformsbetterthanBICinsmallsamplesandislesslikely
to underestimatethe lag length. Given the large sample size in our application, we
suspect that the BIC will outperform other non-consistent criteria. We note that
the BIC criterion generally biases the results towards more parsimonious models.
The BIC criterion selects the TAR(3;7,6) and we report the results in Table 4.
The two thresholds are −0.0224 and 0.0003, respectively 0.46 percent below and
0.006 percent above parity. While the lower gold point estimate might seem rea-
sonable the upper gold point estimate is too low to be credible. The upper regime
also shows barely any convergence; in fact, it has a root closer to unity than the
middle regime. Only the equality of the steady states and the threshold estimates
seems to have some validity.
Under the assumption of a random walk in the middle regime, a test for the
equality of the steady states of the outer regimes and the threshold estimates is
simply a test of the continuous versus the discontinuous threshold model. We are
unaware of any formal test for this purpose.
Testing for additional nonlinearities is not straightforward and has attracted
very little attention in the literature.24 The difﬁculty arises because the nuisance
24ThetestinHansen(1999)excludesregime-dependentheteroskedasticityandcannotbeapplied
here.
20Figure 3: Restricted TAR(3): Sum of Squared Residuals as a




































Notes: See text and Table 3. The sum of squares shown is minimized over all
other parameters.
parameters γr are not identiﬁed under the null, which makes the distribution of
a likelihood ratio test nonstandard. This problem is sometimes referred to as the
Davies problem (see Davies, 1977 and 1987). Two tests for testing linear versus





limitedset ofsecond andthird orderterms,and testifthisregressionis statistically
signiﬁcant. Tsay’s test exploits the similarity between change-point models and
TAR models: after reordering the data based on the selection variable xt−d, one
tests for the orthogonality of the one-step ahead prediction error relative to the
right-hand side variables.
Assuming that the thresholds are known, we can test for TAR(R)a g a i n s t
TAR(R + S) models by applying the above linearity tests on each regime. In
the discontinuous TAR model the threshold estimates are rate-T consistent while
slope estimates are only rate-
√
T consistent and thus we can treat the thresholds
as known and proceed accordingly. But if the TAR is continuous this argument





Regime Lower Middle Upper
T 418 3857 6341
SEE 0.0036 0.0021 0.0017
β0 -0.000908 -0.000030 -0.000009
(0.001007) (0.000063) (0.000040)
β1 1.002 1.061 1.117
(0.050) (0.016) (0.012)
β2 0.024 -0.053 -0.048
(0.079) (0.023) (0.018)
β3 -0.123 -0.042 -0.010
(0.084) (0.023) (0.018)
β4 0.033 0.002 -0.037
(0.079) (0.024) (0.018)
β5 0.088 0.000 -0.014
(0.080) (0.024) (0.017)
β6 -0.391 0.033 -0.011
(0.083) (0.024) (0.018)
β7 0.319 -0.015 -0.001
(0.053) (0.016) (0.012)
 7
i=1 βi 0.952 0.987 0.996
Steady state x -0.0191 -0.0022 -0.0020
Tsay test 37.31 76.42 46.96
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
LST 150.43 226.53 115.61
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: See text. Standarderrorsin parentheses. p valuein brackets. Standarderrorsarecalculated
under the assumptions of the discontinuous threshold model.
does not hold and we are unable to construct valid tests of remaining nonlineari-
ties. Nevertheless, in Table 4 we report the Tsay and LST statistics. Although the
signiﬁcance level is likely to be overstated, the evidence suggests that remaining
nonlinearities are somewhat problematic for the model as applied here.
Concluding,almosteveryimplicationoftheeconomicmodel—singlelaginAR
processes, linearity after allowingfor twothresholds, symmetry of thresholds, and
symmetry in speed of adjustment—is strongly rejected. Only the unit root in the
middle regime, and possibly the outer-regime convergence towards the thresholds
have some validity.
224.3 A Non-Parametric Model
The results of the previous section are discouraging. We think that the problems
are caused by declining thresholds, that is, an increase over time in “market inte-
gration.”
The ﬁrst strong indication of a changing degree of integration comes from
Figure 4. It presents the standard deviation of xt around the mean and around zero
in a moving window of 1,000 observations. Both graphs show a strong decline
over the entire period although the standard deviation around the mean shows a
gradual decline over the entire period, while the standard deviation around zero
shows a rapid decline during the second half of the period.25
Since we have no priors on how market integration improved over time, it is
natural to think of a non-parametric approach. Speciﬁcally, we take a moving
window of 1500 observations (about 5 years) and estimate a constant threshold
model in each window.26 First, to regain some conﬁdence in the model after the
disastrous results of the previous section we estimate an unrestricted model and
test the symmetry of the thresholds, the unit root behavior in the middle regime,
the convergence towards the thresholds in the outer regimes, and the symmetry
of the speed of adjustment in the two outer regimes. We imposed the restriction
of a single lag to limit the number of models that we needed to estimate. The
symmetry of thresholds is tested in the following way: we estimate a model with
symmetric thresholds but examine whether thresholds that are identiﬁed mainly
from lower regime data are different from thresholds identiﬁed mainly from upper
regime data.







1xt−i +  1
t , xt−1 < −γ
β2
0 + β2
1xt−i +  2
t , −γ ≤ xt−1 <γ
β3
0 + β3
1xt−i +  3
t ,γ ≤ xt−1
(8)
As before we impose that the upper and lower thresholds combined have at
least 5% and at most95% of the observations. Since it is possiblethat during the 5
year period the exchangerate stayed withinthe middleregimemostof the timewe
might not be able to identify the thresholds for each window. To purge thresholds
25These trends for daily data mimic the patterns seen in Ofﬁcer’s monthly data seen in Table 1.
26We took 1500 as a reasonable visual compromise between under- and oversmoothing. The
windowshiftedby10observationseachtimetolimitthecomputationalcosts. Asingleobservation
was eliminatedbecauseit was an extremeoutlier andstronglyaffectingthe results wheneverit was
present in the window.














at the 10% level.
Westartwithan evaluationoftherandomwalkpredictioninthemiddleregime
and thetestsof convergencetowardsthethresholdsin theouterregimes. Together,
these predictions would imply that the threshold model is continuous. Since no
formal tests exists for testing either prediction we proceed rather informally.
Concerning unit root behavior in the middle regime, we found the mean and
standard deviation of β2
1 were 0.9961 and 0.0420 respectively. Only 2.26% of the
observationsarehigherthan1.025orlowerthan0.975. Theestimatedinterceptsin
themiddleregimehaveameanof−0.000012andastandarddeviationof0.000057.
Figure 5 shows the correspondence between directly estimated thresholds (γ)a n d
the implied steady state of the outer regime in each sample.27 The question is
whether the outer-regime dynamics converge to the edge of the band, as in the
continuous case. Looking across all of the sample windows, this property appears
to hold.
We view these results as offering support for the continuous threshold model.
27Note that6of483pointsarenotshownsincetheyfalloutsidethe plotarea. These pointsshow
very different steady states from threshold estimates.
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We also compared the speed of adjustment in the two outer regimes. Here the
model is not consistent with the data: the mean convergence rates are about 0.76
for the lower regime and 0.94 for the upper regime.
Based on these results we subsequently estimated nonparametrically a con-
tinuous threshold model similar to equation (7) relaxing only the equality of the
λ parameters in the two outer regimes. The estimated thresholds are shown in
Figure 6, and are labeled “nonparametric estimate.”28 Figure 6 provides evidence
that the gold points experienced a dramatic decline during the period. Threshold
estimates declined from 0.0375 at the start of the period to less than 0.010 in the
end.
4.4 A Smooth Time-Trend Model
Given these ﬁndings, we prefer to model the dynamics of the gold points as a
parametrically speciﬁed smooth time-trend during the entire period. Based on the
resultsintheprevioussection,weestimateafullyrestrictedmodelasinequation(7)
with the exception that we relax the symmetry of the speed of adjustment.
28Thegraphisverysimilartoagraphconstructedfromthethresholdestimatesintheunrestricted
model.






























−λ1(xt−1 − γ(t)) +  1
t when xt−1 >γ( t)
 2
t when γ(t) ≥ xt−1 > −γ(t)
−λ3(xt−1 + γ(t)) +  3
t when −γ(t)>xt−1
(9)
Again estimatingthis model using CLSE as explained earlier implies that γ(t)
has to be chosen using a grid search. This restricts the feasible number of un-
known parameters in γ(t). Although maybe not completely satisfactory consid-
ering Figure 6, we estimated such a model with only two unknown parameters:
γ(t) = γ0e−γ1t with t = 1,...,10615.29
29The model remains a continuous model, and so we again rely on the Chan and Tsay (1998)
methodology, adapted to this case. We started with a grid of 100 values for γ0 between 0.00 and
0.05 and 100 values for γ1 between −0.001 and 0.001. We then repeated the search, each time
choosing an increasingly reﬁned grid around the optimal point from the previous stage.







Regime Lower Middle Upper
T 1144 6365 3106
SEE 0.002797713 0.002022852 0.001522273
Tsay test 6.810 0.297 5.555
(0.033) (0.862) (0.062)




Notes: See text. Standard errorsin parentheses. p values in brackets. The threshold is modeled as
γ(t) = γ0e−γ1t.
TheresultsarereportedinTable5. WealsocomputetheTsayandLSTstatistics
for illustration. Strictly speaking these tests are invalid for the continuous model,
and may overstate the signiﬁcance level as before, but compared to the earlier
resultsthesestatisticsare nowmuch lower, suggestingthatthere is littleremaining
nonlinearity.
That is, there seems to be some nonlinearity left, but this is unsurprising with
more than 10,000 observations and the signiﬁcance levels have decreased enor-
mously from Table 4. The estimate of γ(t) is plotted in Figure 6, labeled “smooth
estimate.” Perhaps surprisingly, this time trend is fairly ﬂat compared to the non-
parametric estimates. The time trend shows a decline of gold points from 0.0204
to 0.0121 during the full period while the non-parametric estimates decrease from
0.0375 to 0.0058. The non-parametric estimates suggest a very rapid decline in
threshold size during the ﬁrst decade (the 1880s) which is obviouslynot picked up
by the smooth time-trend model. Either way, the evidence strongly points towards
gold points that have signiﬁcantly declined during the full period.
5 Gold Flows and Gold Point Estimates
Should we have much faith in this very different method for extracting adjustment
dynamics, a method of revealed preference that derives implicit thresholds for
27quantity movements solely from the price dynamics? It would be nice to perform
Newcomb’s cross-check to see if our thresholds do a better job of predicting gold
ﬂows, so as to validate our model with ﬂow data. Still, we are almost stymied in
this regard since, for the most part, the extant ﬂow data remain under a dark cloud
of suspicion, as already noted (Morgenstern 1955; Goodhart 1969; Ofﬁcer 1996).
Nonetheless, we can now present a limited quantity-based cross-check on our
method. In Figure 7, we plot for the time period for which we have Mint Report
goldexportdata,theexchangerate,ourgoldexportpointestimatesfromthesmooth
time trend model, and Ofﬁcer’s export GPA gold point. With circles we indicate
on the exchange rate line those days when substantial gold exports (more than
$50,000) were observed. To account for the short lag in buying bills and shipping
gold, we plot themaximumof the exchange rate in the three days before the actual
shipment. On the bottom of the graph we also show the actual volume of the
exports.
As mentioned before gold ﬂow data are not very reliable. This is a possible
reason for the ﬁve observations where gold was shipped to the U.K. when the
exchange rate was actually below parity. It might also be the case that for these
observations gold was shipped for other reasons than gold point arbitrage, a possi-
bility that always renders problematic cross-checks of this kind. This explaination
seems to be favored by the fact that the volumes shipped were small compared to
other gold shipments. In any case, any single gold export observation should be
viewed with skepticism and only general patterns can be considered relevant.
Our gold point estimates predict actual gold ﬂows quite well for the period
1890-1896. For this period we observe almost no gold movement when exchange
rates are within the bound and observe almost everytime some gold ﬂow when the
exchange rate is above the gold point. Arguably, however, the gold point might
be slightly higher than our estimate (our non-parametric estimate is a little bit
higherthan thesmoothtrend estimate, and possiblymoreaccurate). Ofﬁcer’s gold
point, however, is almost certainly too high, except possibly for a short period in
1895. Around the turn of the century, our gold point estimate seems too low while
Ofﬁcer’s estimate seems again too high. The truth appears to be somewhere in
the middle. At the end of the period, between 1907 and 1910, it appears that we
have hit the gold export point almost exactly right, although there are a couple
of peaks that show no gold ﬂows. Overall, by volume, only 35% of gold exports
in this period occured at exchange rates above Ofﬁcer’s gold point; 50% of ﬂows
occurred above our estimate but below Ofﬁcer’s; and only 15% of ﬂows occured
below our estimate (with less than 1% below parity).
Figure8showsthesamegraphforColeman’sgoldimportdataandtheestimated
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29gold import points.30 There are several reasons why this graph is less reliable than
Figure 7. First, Coleman only collected weekly aggregates of gold imports. So
the timing, of the gold imports is less precise and for this reason we have plotted
the maximum exchange rate over ten days. Second, one has to account for the lag
withwhichgoldimportsarrive. Thislagislikelytobesomewherefromonetotwo
weeks. We have taken it to be ten days and so plotted with circles the maximum
exchange rate from 19 days until 10 days before the end of the reporting week
which showed gold imports. Third, Coleman collected the data from newspaper
reports which are considered the least reliable source for gold shipments. These
import data reveal some oddities. In 1895 and 1896 we see that large imports
occurred at an exchange rate far above parity, but Coleman explains these as being
driven by subscriptions to a large gold bond issue by the U.S Treasury, and hence
such ﬂows were unrelated to gold point arbitrage. We may also question the cause
ofthegoldimportsobservedinlate1898andearly1899atexchangeratesonlyjust
below 4.86. If these data are correct then our gold point estimates seem too high
(that is, too far from parity). However, if these observationsare also due to special
circumstances then our estimates seem too be hitting the gold import point almost
exactly. It is also clear that Ofﬁcer’s GPA gold import point is almost certainly
too high. Overall, by volume, none of the gold imports in this period occured at
exchange rates below Ofﬁcer’s gold point (indeed the exchange rate never fell so
low); 47% of imports occurred below our estimate but above Ofﬁcer’s; and 52%
of ﬂows occured above our estimate (with 22% above parity, although most likely
this large fraction of the ﬂows was related to the gold bond issue and should be set
to one side).
6 Conclusions
Our study offers several new issues for consideration. We have shown that work
on the classical gold standard need not be conﬁned to annual, quarterly, monthly,
or even weekly data. Many ﬁnancial publications list daily data, and we sample
just one to construct a new series of dollar-sterling exchange rates. Such data are
essentialfortheproperstudyofexchangeratedynamicswherearbitrageoperations
were measured in days.
We then modeled the actual arbitrage process as described by the actors and
experts at the time. We argued that increasing marginal costs of arbitrage are
30Only imports of more than $350,000 in a week are considered to be substantial, as indicated
by circles.
30essentialtounderstandingthefunctioningofthesystem,inparticulartoexplainthe
fact that persistent gold point “violations” and gold ﬂows could be observed. Our
model implies nonlinear dynamics and we used threshold autoregression methods
to identify two distinct regimes of exchange rate behavior: an inner band with a
randomwalk,andanouterbandwheretheexchangeraterevertsinwards. Naturally,
thethresholdshaveaninterpretationasimplicitorrevealed-preferencegoldpoints.
We compared our estimated thresholds with accepted estimates of the gold
points, and found very different trends in the two measures. Our threshold de-
clined dramatically but the measured gold points were fairly stable. We take this
as evidence that the classical gold standard was an evolving standard in ways not
verywellcapturedbyexistingcostsmeasuresalone. Ourconjectureisthatvarious
dynamic considerations could have acted to cause arbitrage to operate at different
thresholds: for example, evolving concerns over the reputation of the convert-
ibility commitment and the evolution of new technologies (or “learning”) in the
market itself. There might also have been increasing competition in the business
of arbitrage itself, leading to decreases in the implied cost parameters.
There is some anecdotal evidence of changing costs over time, sometimes in
waysdramaticenoughtosurpriseevenseasonedmarketparticipants. Forexample,
there is an indication that, late in the period, banks trading on their own account
were able to execute arbitrage, even in coin, at very low margins, perhaps below
even their posted rates in the reports used today to construct direct gold point
estimates. Thus, on May 20, 1909, the New York Post noted unusually heavy
exportsofgoldcoin, about$2.5million,and observedthatnewsofsuch shipments
“was received with considerable surprise in ﬁnancial circles, as it was not thought
heavyexportsofthemetalcouldbemadeatprevailingexchangerates. Thebankers
making the shipments announced, however, that they were not losing money on
the operation.”31 So much for received wisdom. One is relieved, of course, to
learn that bankers had ﬁgured out how not to make a loss on simple arbitrage. At
face value, this report offers strong support for our revealed-preference measures
ofthegold points—atthe very least compared to method(a), consultingan expert!
Is such a report plausible? For reference, on May 19, the exchange rate stood
at 4.87775, about 0.2 cents above our export point (4.8756) but still 2 cents below
Ofﬁcer’s GPA export point (4.8909). Two tenths of a cent might not sound like
much of a proﬁt, but in this business the margins had certainly been shrinking,
perhaps as a result of competition among banks. The correspondent for Bankers
Magazine,couldreportonJune1910(p. 924)that“thereisnotmuchproﬁtinship-
31Quotes here and below are as cited at <http://www.rms-republic.com>.
31pinggoldasmightbethought,athousanddollarsoneachmillionbeingconsidered
quite enough of an inducement to make banking houses go in for transactions of
this kind.” Given the dollar-sterling parity, a margin of about 0.486 cents was ap-
parently thought sufﬁcient; by that reckoning, an extra 0.2 cents, as in May 1909,
could be considered a signiﬁcant extra incentive.
Thus, though the example par excellence of monetary stability in an interna-
tional setting, the classical gold standard may yet deserve analysis as more than
just a monolithic, rule-bound system driven by the simple arithmetic of arbitrage
operations. And it should be seen that the analysis of the gold points is more than
an accounting exercise, and is a key ingredient in a fundamental method of mar-
ket integration analysis, the comparison of measured costs to revealed behavioral
responses. Our technique promises to be of use in all ﬁelds of market integration
research, and opportunities abound to extend this type of study to other currencies
or to markets for other goods.
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